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ABSTRACT
Some of the rights enshrined in the ECHR are absolute (the prohibition of torture (Article 
3), the prohibition of slavery and forced labor (Article 4)). It means that they can under no 
circumstances be restricted or reduced.
All other rights may be partially restricted under the terms of Art. 15 of the ECHR, in cases 
of social urgency – martial / emergency within the limits necessary to prevent the threat to the 
life of the nation. Some ECHR articles explicitly state the conditions for restrictions on human 
rights and freedoms. So, the right to privacy (Art. 8), freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion (Art. 9), freedom of expression (Art. 10) and freedom of assembly (Art. 11) may be 
restricted, if required by the law and is necessary in a democratic society.
Thus, conventional rights may also have inherent limitations. In particular, in some cases, the 
rights guaranteed by the various articles of the ECHR collide.
Therefore, the main objective of this paper is to research the essence and core elements of the 
principle of proportionality in the jurisprudence of the ECtHR.
To evaluate the proportionality of an interference with a right or freedom, it is necessary to 
determine its impact on the law, the causes of the interference, its results, the importance of 
local circumstances, and the complexity of objective evaluation of relevant rights and interests. 
It is the states that must justify such intervention. Herewith, the reasons should be ‘substantial 
and sufficient’, the need for the restriction ‘established by the law’, the exceptions ‘clearly stated’, 
and the interference must comply with ‘urgent social need’.
According to the principle of proportionality, all legal actions and state decisions must be estab-
lished by the law, necessary, relevant (suitable) and least restricts the right of the individual. In 
addition, the proportionality test must ensure that a person’s loss from the restriction of the right 
is commensurate with the benefit from the aim pursued. The balance is fair, if the restriction 
does not encroach on the very essence of the right and does not cause its real content to be lost.
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In assessing the proportionality of a state’s interference, the ECtHR applies the doctrine of the 
margin of appreciation, which can be broad or narrow.
Thus, the principle of proportionality, which is closely linked to the principle of effective pro-
tection, significantly influences the case law of the ECtHR. Most of the disputes over propor-
tionality arise in the context of human rights restrictions guaranteed by Articles 8 (2) – 11 (2) 
of the ECHR.
Therefore, the principle of proportionality requires national public authorities to strike a fair 
balance between competing public and private interests at stake. The ECtHR assesses such 
factors, as the importance of competing interests, objectivity (adequacy, reasonableness) of the 
restriction, the existence of consensus among Council of Europe member States on the issue 
under consideration.
Keywords: European Court of Human Rights, limitations on human rights, democratic ne-
cessity test, principle of proportionality, margin of appreciation, consensus
1. INTRODUCTION
The principle of proportionality is extremely important for the effective protec-
tion of human rights in practice, as it concerns any interference with or restriction 
of human rights, primarily, by a state. This principle follows that any action by a 
state that in one way or another affects human rights must be necessary, expedient 
(appropriate), and reasonably justified by a state in each case. Thus, the principle 
of proportionality imposes a positive obligation on public authorities to prove the 
need for their actions, which restrict human rights. Therefore, any actions or mea-
sures that a state takes to achieve its legitimate aim and which interfere in some 
way with human rights and freedoms must pass the so-called proportionality test, 
which was originally developed in the German legal doctrine1. 
On the other hand, the principle of proportionality is an integral tool of a judge, 
who, when resolving a dispute, usually deals with various human rights, as well 
as interests, including private and public ones, which come into conflict. In such 
cases, in order to strike a fair balance, a judge weighs these rights and interests and, 
ultimately, gives priority to one of them. In any case, a court decision must be 
reasonable and fair. In this context I bear in mind neither formal justice, which can 
be essentially understood as equality before the law and the court, nor procedural 
justice (fairness regarding outcomes), but, prima facie, material (substantive) 
justice that concerns the justice or injustice of the content of rules or laws. So, it is 
substantive justice that is manifested in the principle of proportionality (such as, 
for example, the proportionality of the gravity of the offense and the specific type 
and measure of legal liability for its commission).
1  Möller, K., Proportionality: Challenging the critics, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 10, 
issue 3, 2012, pp. 709 – 731
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Consequently, in seeking to achieve a fair balance, a court always balances between 
different rights and issues at stake. Of course, one can argue about the existence of 
objective justice and truth, but nonetheless in every case the main task of a court 
is to find the solution to the issue that would be justified in terms of the optimal 
balance of various human rights and interests in modern society, which is devel-
oping dynamically and requires constant updating of approaches, including law 
enforcement. Thereby, the principle of proportionality underlies the application 
of law, whose main ultimate goal is to protect human rights.
Based on the foregoing, it can be noted that the principle of proportionality is 
multidimensional. Moreover, it is a general principle of law (‘optimization re-
quirement’2) that includes key ideas of law (prima facie requirements3). However, 
the application of the principle of proportionality is not always so obvious. It de-
pends on many factors. First and foremost, the interpretation and argumentation 
of the court depends on the specific type of human rights and interests at stake, 
and also, if we study the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 
(hereinafter: ECtHR), on the presence or absence of consensus among the mem-
ber states of the Council of Europe regarding the issue under consideration. This 
involves the so-called doctrine of the margin of appreciation (free discretion) of a 
state, which can be wide or narrow. According to it, the ECtHR gives priority to 
the state’s assessment, interpretation of certain events, facts, actions, situations and 
any other phenomena within its own jurisdiction4. The width of the margin de-
pends on the interests at stake, the context of the interference, the impact of a pos-
sible consensus in such matters, the aim pursued by the interference, the degree 
of proportionality of it, etc.5 The doctrine is further of practical importance in 
the context of the interpretation of the permissible limitations on human rights6.
2. PERMISSIBLE LIMITATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
Under the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR) any spe-
cific interference with human rights is permissible only if it is necessary in pursuit 
2  Alexy, R., Constitutional Rights, Balancing and Rationality, Ratio Juris, vol. 16, 2003, pp. 131 – 140
3  Alexy, R., Formal principles: Some replies to critics, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 12, 
issue 3, 2014, pp. 511 – 524
4  Judgment Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976), Application no. 5493/72, par. 48, 49, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57499], accessed 20. March 2020
5  Spielmann, D., Allowing the Right Margin the European Court of Human Rights and the National Mar-
gin of Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?, Cambridge yearbook of Euro-
pean Legal Studies, vol.. 14, 2012, pp. 381 – 418
6  McGoldrick, D., A defence of the margin of appreciation and an argument for its application by the Human 
Rights Committee, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 65, issue 1, 2016, pp. 21 – 60
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of one of the legitimate aims listed in the ECHR7. The degree of such interference 
depends on the specific right. Therefore, absolute human rights (prohibition of 
torture, slavery and forced labor) cannot be limited. When it comes to the funda-
mental and non-derogable right to life (Art. 2)8, the grounds for the interference 
are significantly limited. In particular, according to Article 2 of the ECHR, any 
deprivation of life may be justified as a result of the use of force, if it is absolutely 
necessary and only on the exhaustive grounds, namely: in defence of any person 
from unlawful violence; in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape 
of a person lawfully detained; in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling 
a riot or insurrection.9
Other rights and freedoms (non-absolute, qualified human rights), such as the 
right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8), freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion (Art. 9), freedom of expression (Art. 10), freedom of assembly and 
association (Art. 11) may be restricted in accordance with the law when it is neces-
sary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the 
economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for 
the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
of others.10
Moreover, Article 10 of the ECHR enshrines along with the restrictions already 
listed, such additional grounds for restrictions, as the interest of territorial integ-
rity, the prevention of disclosure of information received in confidence, as well as 
the maintenance of the authority and the impartiality of the judiciary.11
In addition, Art. 15 de facto allows countries to derogate from their convention 
obligations in the event of war or other public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, and in 
consistence with their other obligations under international law.12 In this case, 
international humanitarian law comes into force.
Thereby, the question arises as to the criteria according to which these restrictions 
should be determined and applied in practice, since the analysis of the fixed re-
strictions shows that their meaning and, accordingly, interpretation may vary due 
7  Article 18 ECHR
8  Judgment McCann and Others v. the United Kingdom (1995), Application no. 18984/91, par. 147, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57943], accessed 20. March 2020
9  Article 2 par. 2 ECHR
10  Articles 8 – 11 ECHR
11  Article 10 ECHR
12  Article 15 ECHR
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to numerous factors. And it is the ECtHR in its jurisprudence that clarifies the 
very essence and content of these restrictions.
In the present paper, I would like to concentrate on such vague concepts, as ‘pre-
scribed by law’ and ‘necessity in a democratic society’, which requires an assess-
ment of their proportionality and, thus, directly depend on the margin of appre-
ciation afforded to a state.
2.1. ‘Legal’ interference with human rights and freedoms
As stated above, any interference with or restriction of human rights must be ‘in 
accordance with the law’ or ‘prescribed by law’.13 In its jurisprudence the ECtHR 
provides explanation of such ‘legal’ interference with specific human rights and 
freedoms. In particular, in the case of Huvig v. France (1990) it points out that 
“the expression ‘in accordance with the law’, within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 
(art. 8-2), requires firstly that the impugned measure should have some basis in 
domestic law; it also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that 
it should be accessible to the person concerned, who must moreover be able to 
foresee its consequences for him, and compatible with the rule of law”.14 The 
ECtHR further underlines that the consequences need not be foreseeable with 
absolute certainty, since “it may bring in its train excessive rigidity and the law 
must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws 
are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and 
whose interpretation and application are questions of practice”.15 The degree of 
precision required of the ‘law’ depends on the particular subject-matter.16 
The ECtHR “has always understood the term ‘law’ in its ‘substantive’ sense, not its 
‘formal’ one; it has included both enactments of lower rank than statutes … and 
unwritten law. …In a sphere covered by the written law, the ‘law’ is the enactment 
in force as the competent courts have interpreted it in the light, if necessary, of any 
new practical developments”.17
13  Articles 8 – 11 ECHR
14  Judgment Huvig v. France (1990), Application no. 11105/84, par. 26, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-57627], accessed 20. March 2020
15  Judgment The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (1979), Application no. 6538/74, par. 49, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57584], accessed 20. March 2020
16  Judgment Malone v. the United Kingdom (1984), Application no. 8691/79, par. 68, [http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-57533], accessed 20. March 2020
17  Judgment Kruslin v. France (1990), Application no. 11801/85, par. 29, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-57626], accessed 20. March 2020
Kristina Trykhlib: THE PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN THE JURISPRUDENCE... 133
Indeed, the law must “indicate with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of 
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the public authorities” in order to 
provide the enjoyment of the minimum degree of protection of the citizens under 
the rule of law in a democratic society,18 while respecting the legitimate aim of 
such measure, that would give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary 
interference.19 On the other hand, the detailed procedures and conditions to be 
observed do not necessarily have to be incorporated in rules of substantive law.20 
It may be enshrined in the secondary law (delegated or subordinate legislation, 
which is created by ministers or other bodies, e.g., decrees, orders, decisions, in-
structions, directives, regulations, etc.). 
Thus, the ‘accessibility’ requires the law to be brought to the public attention, that 
is, the public proclamation (promulgation) of laws and their publication, with a 
view to familiarize individuals with their content and, subsequently, the possibility 
to foresee the consequences in case of application of a certain law.
Regarding the requirement of the law’s ‘foreseeability’ as to the meaning, nature 
and the scope of the applicable measures, the ECtHR emphasizes that “the phrase 
‘in accordance with the law’ does not merely refer back to domestic law but also 
relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of 
law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention…”21 For 
instance, concerning the right to respect for private and family life (Art. 8), there 
must be a measure of legal protection in national law against arbitrary interfer-
ences by public authorities, especially where executive power is exercised in secret. 
In any case, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give individuals an 
adequate indication as to the circumstances and the conditions on which public 
authorities are empowered to interfere with the rights.22
The scope of the ‘foreseeability’ and ‘accessibility’ depends on the content of the 
instrument in issue, the sphere of regulation, the number and status of those to 
whom it is addressed.23
18  Judgment Huvig v. France (1990), op. cit., note 6, par. 35
19  Judgment Malone v. the United Kingdom (1984), op. cit., note 8, par. 68
20  Judgment Silver and Others v. the United Kingdom (1983), Application no. 5947/72; 6205/73; 7052/75; 
7061/75; 7107/75; 7113/75; 7136/75, par. 88, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57577], ac-
cessed 20. March 2020
21  Judgment Malone v. the United Kingdom (1984), op. cit., note 8, par. 67
22  Judgment Kruslin v. France (1990), op. cit., note 9, par. 29
23  Judgment Groppera Radio AG and Others v. Switzerland (1990), Application no. 10890/84, par. 68, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57623], accessed 20. March 2020
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2.2.  Democratic necessity test 
Since any interference with human rights (in particular, with rights guaranteed by 
Articles 8 – 11 of the ECHR) must be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, it is ad-
visable to define this concept. Moreover, the ECtHR in its practice has developed 
certain criteria for assessing such necessity, – the so-called democratic necessity 
test. 
It is extremely difficult to test the persuasiveness of any defence position of a state, 
so, the main objective of this test is to “ensure that it complies with the genuine 
interests of democracy and is not merely political expediency in disguise”.24 
The ECtHR highlights that “not only is political democracy a fundamental feature 
of the European public order but the Convention was designed to promote and 
maintain the ideals and values of a democratic society. ...By virtue of the wording 
of the second paragraph of Article 11, and likewise of Articles 8, 9 and 10 of the 
Convention, the only necessity capable of justifying an interference with any of 
the rights enshrined in those Articles is one that may claim to spring from ‘dem-
ocratic society’…”25 In its practice, the ECtHR refers to such basic elements of a 
‘democratic society’, as pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. It also points 
out that “democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must 
always prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treat-
ment of minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position…”26
Based on the case law of the ECtHR, the so-called absolute (strict) necessity test 
and the persuasive (general) test on necessity (‘the convincing necessity’) can be 
distinguished. Herewith, the application of a certain approach depends on the 
specific type of human rights. Thus, when it comes to the deprivation of life, the 
democratic necessity test is very strict. In turn, by referring to the rights guaran-
teed in Articles 8 – 11, the persuasive test on necessity must be applied.
2.2.1.  Standard of ‘absolute necessity’
As stated the ECtHR, the term ‘deprivation of life’ “indicates that a stricter and 
more compelling test of necessity must be employed by the Court, if compared 
with that normally applicable when determining whether State action is ‘necessary 
in a democratic society’ under paragraphs 2 of Articles 8 to 11 of the Convention. 
24  Greer, S., The exceptions to Articles 8 to 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of 
Europe Publishing, Strasbourg, 1997, p. 14
25  Judgment Gorzelik and Others v. Poland (2004), Application no. 44158/98, par. 89, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61637], accessed 20. March 2020
26  Ibid., par. 90
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Consequently, the force used must be strictly proportionate to the achievement of 
the permitted aims…”27
Moreover, the ECtHR points out that “any use of force must be no more than 
‘absolutely necessary’ for the achievement of one or more of the purposes set out 
in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c). …The authorities must take appropriate care to en-
sure that any risk to life is minimised. The Court must also examine whether the 
authorities were not negligent in their choice of action. … The same applies to 
an attack where the victim survives but which, because of the lethal force used, 
amounted to attempted murder…”28
In this, “the circumstances in which deprivation of life may be justified must be 
strictly construed. … In particular, the Court has held that the opening of fire 
should, whenever possible, be preceded by warning shots... The use of force by 
agents of the State in pursuit of one of the aims delineated in paragraph 2 of Article 
2 of the Convention may be justified under this provision where it is based on an 
honest belief which is perceived, for good reasons, to be valid at the time but which 
subsequently turns out to be mistaken. To hold otherwise would be to impose an 
unrealistic burden on the State and its law-enforcement personnel in the execution 
of their duty, perhaps to the detriment of their lives and those of others…”29
Effective respect for human rights requires that policing operations be sufficiently 
regulated by national legislation, the existence of a system of adequate and ef-
fective safeguards against arbitrariness and abuse of force, even against avoidable 
accident.30 “Members of the security forces should not be left in a vacuum when 
performing their duties, whether in the context of a prepared operation or a spon-
taneous chase of a person perceived to be dangerous: a legal and administrative 
framework should define the limited circumstances in which law-enforcement of-
ficials may use force and firearms, in the light of the international standards which 
have been developed in this respect. … In particular, law enforcement agents must 
be trained to assess whether or not there is an absolute necessity to use firearms, 
not only on the basis of the letter of the relevant regulations, but also with due 
regard to the pre-eminence of respect for human life as a fundamental value…”31
27  Judgment Finogenov and Others v. Russia (2012), Application nos. 18299/03 and 27311/03, par. 210, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-108231], accessed 20. March 2020
28  Judgment Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005), Application nos. 57947/00, 57948/00 and 
57949/00, par. 169, 171, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-68379], accessed 20. March 2020
29  Judgment Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (2011), Application no 23458/02, par. 177, 178, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-104098], accessed 20. March 2020
30  Ibid., par. 162
31  Ibid., par. 162, 163
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Hence, the ECtHR emphasizes that when lethal force is used by a state, it must 
take into consideration and assess various aspects, such as the actions of the agents 
of a state who actually administered the force, all the surrounding circumstances, 
including the relevant legal or regulatory framework in place, the planning and 
control of the actions under examination.32
Nevertheless, the ECtHR may occasionally depart from the standard of ‘absolute 
necessity’, particularly, in cases where certain aspects of the situation lie far beyond 
its expertise, where the national authorities had to act under tremendous time 
pressure, and where their control of the situation was minimal.33 Meanwhile, 
“the more predictable a hazard, the greater the obligation to protect against it”.34
2.2.2.  Persuasive (convincing) test on necessity
Regarding the rights guaranteed by Articles 8 – 11 of the ECHR, the necessity 
test is persuasive. In particular, the ECtHR stresses that the freedom of expression 
“constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society; subject to 
paragraph 2 of Article 10 (art. 10-2), it is applicable not only to ‘information’ or 
‘ideas’ that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of in-
difference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb. Freedom of expression, 
as enshrined in Article 10 (art. 10), is subject to a number of exceptions which, 
however, must be narrowly interpreted and the necessity for any restrictions must 
be convincingly established”35.
Following the practice of the ECtHR, the convincing necessity test requires estab-
lishing the existence of a ‘pressing social need’ and ‘relevant and sufficient’ reasons 
for interference with human rights and freedoms enshrined in Articles 8 – 11. 
Such interference also must be ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim’ pursued by 
public authorities.36
Thus, in the case of The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) the ECtHR 
explained that “the adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2 
(art. 10-2), implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’. The Contracting States 
32  Ibid., par. 164
33  Ibid., par. 211
34  Judgment Kavaklıoğlu and Others v. Turkey (2016), Application no. 15397/02, par. 176, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-157821], accessed 20. March 2020
35  Judgment Observer and Guardian v. the United Kingdom (1991), Application no. 13585/88, par. 59 
(a), [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57705], accessed 20. March 2020
36  Judgment National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. 
France (2018), Application nos. 48151/11 and 77769/13, par. 167, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-180442], accessed 20. March 2020
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have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but 
it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the law and 
the decisions applying it, even those given by independent courts. The Court is 
therefore empowered to give the final ruling on whether a ‘restriction’ is reconcil-
able with freedom of expression as protected by Article 10 (art. 10)”.37 The main 
task of the ECtHR is “to look at the interference complained of in the light of the 
case as a whole and determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued’ and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it 
are ‘relevant and sufficient’”.38
The ECtHR also emphasizes that the adjective ‘necessary’, within the meaning of 
Article 10 (2), is not synonymous with ‘indispensable’, neither has it the flexibility 
of such expressions as ‘admissible’, ‘ordinary’, ‘useful’, ‘reasonable’ or ‘desirable’, 
and that it implies the existence of a ‘pressing social need’. In this context, the 
domestic authorities enjoy a wide margin of appreciation.39 The ECtHR stated: 
“… It is for the national authorities to make the initial assessment of the reality 
of the pressing social need implied by the notion of ‘necessity’ in this context”.40
However, despite the established judicial practice of applying this test, its criteria 
are still quite ambiguous. Therefore, the legal doctrine repeatedly draws attention 
to the need to improve it. It would be advisable the test for fair balance to be sys-
tematically preceded by a means-ends test.41 The test of means and ends would 
allow the ECtHR to examine the justification of the reasonableness of the choice 
of means, which is a substantial element of the reasonableness of an interference 
with human rights. Its application could also be helpful in terms of avoiding the 
difficulties related to balancing review. Moreover, if the ECtHR would find that 
the means or measures chosen by a state were unsuitable or unnecessary, there 
would be no further need to investigate whether, after all, the national authorities 
did strike a fair (reasonable) balance.42
37  Judgment The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (no. 2) (1991), Application no. 13166/87, par. 50 
(c), [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57708], accessed 20. March 2020
38  Ibid., par. 50 (d)
39  Judgment The Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (1979), op. cit., note 15, par. 59
40  Judgment Handyside v. the United Kingdom (1976), op. cit., note 4, par. 48
41  Gerards, J., How to improve the necessity test of the European Court of Human Rights, International Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law, vol. 11, issue 2, 2013, pp. 466 – 490
42  Ibid., p. 488
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3. TEST Of PROPORTIONALITy
According to the principle of proportionality, all legal actions and decisions taken 
by public authorities must be relevant (suitable), that is the appropriateness of 
the measure intended to achieve the legitimate aim pursued by public authority. 
It also includes a ban on using prohibited means, such as torture, and the assess-
ment of the legitimacy of the purpose of taken measure that must derives from 
the constitution and the laws. Moreover, public authorities must provide sufficient 
justification for applying a certain measure and its necessity to achieve a specific 
goal. Hence, the second important requirement for the state actions is the need to 
apply the measure that least restricts the right of the individual. Finally, the third 
criterion is the so-called proportionality in the narrow sense, namely the propor-
tionality of the loss incurred by the infringement of the right to the benefit from 
the goal achieved, – balancing principle (German model)43. At the same time, 
some scholars note that the ECtHR pays the most attention to the proportionality 
in the narrow sense.44
The proportionality test also involves a comparative analysis of the intensity of the 
intervention with the goal being pursued. In this process the legal and moral val-
ues of the society are taken into account, the rights, interests and objectives of the 
parties are weighed. Based on this, the balance is fair provided that the restriction 
does not encroach on the very essence of the right and does not lead to the loss of 
its real content. In this regard, the ECtHR emphasizes: “It must be satisfied that 
the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in 
such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired”.45
Even so, the application of the above requirements causes certain difficulties in 
practice, since their formulation is quite vague. Therefore, in its case law the EC-
tHR developed additional criteria to strike a balance between private and public 
interests, specifically the extent to which both the public authorities and the indi-
vidual acted in good faith, the foreseeability of the state action and the legitimacy 
of the individual’s expectations.46 Thus, in the case of National Union of Rail, 
Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom (2014), the ECtHR didn’t 
find a violation of Article 11 (freedom of assembly and association) and pointed 
43  Alexy, op. cit., note 3, pp. 511 – 524
44  Huber, P., M., The principle of Proportionality, in: Schroeder, W. (ed.), Strengthening the rule of law 
in Europe: from a common concept to mechanisms of implementation, Hart Publishing, Oxford and 
Portland, Oregon, 2016, pp. 98 – 112
45  Judgment Prince Hans-Adam II of Liechtenstein v. Germany (2001), Application no. 42527/98, par. 44, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59591], accessed 20. March 2020
46  Popelier, P.; Van De Heyning, C., Procedural rationality: giving teeth to the proportionality analysis, Eu-
ropean Constitutional Law Review, No. 9 (2), 2013, pp. 230 – 262
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out: “The Government have argued that the ‘pressing social need’ for maintaining 
the statutory ban on secondary strikes is to shield the domestic economy from the 
disruptive effects of such industrial action, which, if permitted, would pose a risk 
to the country’s economic recovery. In the sphere of social and economic policy, 
which must be taken to include a country’s industrial-relations policy, the Court 
will generally respect the legislature’s policy choice unless it is ‘manifestly without 
reasonable foundation’... Moreover, the Court has recognised the ‘special weight’ 
to be accorded to the role of the domestic policy-maker in matters of general poli-
cy on which opinions within a democratic society may reasonably differ widely… 
The ban on secondary action has remained intact for over twenty years, notwith-
standing two changes of government during that time. This denotes a democratic 
consensus in support of it, and an acceptance of the reasons for it, which span a 
broad spectrum of political opinion in the United Kingdom. These considerations 
lead the Court to conclude that in their assessment of how the broader public 
interest is best served in their country in the often charged political, social and 
economic context of industrial relations, the domestic legislative authorities relied 
on reasons that were both relevant and sufficient for the purposes of Article 11”.47 
Moreover, it stressed: “As has been recognised in the case-law, it is legitimate for 
the authorities to be guided by considerations of feasibility, as well as of the practi-
cal difficulties – which, for some legislative schemes, may well be large-scale – to 
which an individuated approach could give rise, such as uncertainty, endless liti-
gation, disproportionate public expenditure to the detriment of the taxpayer and 
possibly arbitrariness”.48
Nevertheless, despite the well-established criteria for the proportionality test, their 
implementation ultimately depends on the width of the margin of appreciation 
granted by the ECtHR to a state. It is the assessment of discretionary powers left 
to public authorities that plays a core role in verifying the compliance with or 
violation of the principle of proportionality by domestic authorities.
4. MARGIN Of APPRECIATION
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation was elaborated in the case law of the 
ECtHR. In fact, it is a key tool of the ECtHR that allows it, on the one hand, to 
impose an autonomous interpretation of conventional rights by the ECtHR on 
domestic authorities and, on the other hand, to limit its interference with the in-
47  Judgment National Union of Rail, Maritime and Transport Workers v. the United Kingdom (2014), Ap-
plication no. 31045/10, par. 99, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-142192], accessed 20. March 
2020
48  Ibid., par. 103
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terpretation provided by national courts.49 Accordingly, by granting a state wider 
or narrower margin of appreciation, the ECtHR takes into consideration the fol-
lowing criteria: 1) the subsidiarity nature of the ECHR. 2) A fair balance between 
the effective protection and the sovereignty of a state (reasonable distribution of 
powers between the supranational and national level). In particular, the ECtHR 
has repeatedly emphasized that domestic authorities are better placed to assess cer-
tain elements of the proportionality test and settle a dispute. 3) Diversity of social 
and political contentions of the ‘good society’ among different states that affects 
the balance between individual rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the concep-
tion of public good in various contexts and societies.50
Thereby, the margin allowed will be relatively narrow or significantly restricted 
where the right at stake is crucial to the individual’s effective enjoyment of in-
timate or key rights and where a particularly important facet of an individual’s 
existence or identity is at stake. The margin will be  wider if the case raises sensitive 
moral or ethical issue.51
Herewith, some researchers suppose that the ‘institutionally sensitive’ approach 
can be applied, in which the legislative bodies will have wider margin of apprecia-
tion than the executive ones.52 For instance, in the Hatton and Others v. the Unit-
ed Kingdom [GC] judgment (2003), the ECtHR referred to the ‘direct democratic 
legitimation’ of legislature and emphasized the subsidiarity nature of the ECHR. 
It stressed that “the national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and 
are, as the Court has held on many occasions, in principle better placed than an 
international court to evaluate local needs and conditions”.53
Hence, the width of the margin of appreciation will vary according to the nature 
of the right in issue, its importance for the individual and the nature of the activi-
ties restricted, as well as the nature of the aim pursued by the restrictions.54
49  Huscroft, G., Proportionality and the Relevance of Interpretation, in: Huscroft, G.; Miller, B. W.; Web-
ber, G.(eds.), Proportionality and the rule of law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, New york, 2014, pp. 186 – 202
50  Popelier; Van De Heyning, op. cit., note 46, p. 231
51  Judgment Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic (2016), Application nos. 28859/11 and 28473/12, 
par. 178, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-168066], accessed 20. March 2020
52  Popelier; Van De Heyning, op. cit., note 46, p. 232
53  Judgment Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC] (2003), Application no. 36022/97, par. 97, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-61188], accessed 20. March 2020
54  Judgment Chapman v. the United Kingdom (2001), Application no. 27238/95, par. 91, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-59154], accessed 20. March 2020
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Therefore, the width of the margin of appreciation depends on the presence or 
absence of the European consensus on a particular issue and on the specific type 
of human rights. In particular, when it comes to absolute rights, the margin is 
narrow. Moreover, if there is a consensus among member states of the Council of 
Europe on a particular issue, the margin of appreciation is narrow too, and vice 
versa. At the same time, if the issue concerns complex moral and ethical issues on 
which there is no consensus, then the margin of a state’s discretion is quite wide.
4.1. Absolute human rights and right to life
4.1.1.  Prohibition of torture
In the case of O’Keeffe v. Ireland (2014) the ECtHR highlighted that “Article 3 
enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democratic society. It prohibits in 
absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”.55 It 
imposes positive obligations on a state and requires a state to take all possible and 
reasonable measures to provide effective protection and “to ensure that individu-
als within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading 
treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individuals”.56
In addition, Article 3 of the ECHR imposes an obligation on a state not to extra-
dite a person who may be subjected to torture in the requested state. Thus, in the 
Trabelsi v. Belgium judgment (2015), the applicant complained that his extradi-
tion to the United States of America exposed him to treatment incompatible with 
Article 3. He contended that offences, on the basis of which his extradition had 
been granted, carried a maximum life prison sentence which was irreducible, and 
that if he were convicted he would have no prospect of ever being released.57 So, 
the ECtHR considered that “under well-established case-law, protection against 
the treatment prohibited under Article 3 is absolute, and as a result the extradi-
tion of a person by a Contracting State can raise problems under this provision 
and therefore engage the responsibility of the State in question under the Conven-
tion, where there are serious grounds to believe that if the person is extradited to 
the requesting country he would run the real risk of being subjected to treatment 
contrary to Article 3…, the Court reiterates that it is acutely conscious of the dif-
ficulties faced by States in protecting their populations against terrorist violence, 
55  Judgment O’Keeffe v. Ireland (2014), Application no. 35810/09, par. 144, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-140235], accessed 20. March 2020
56  Ibid.
57  Judgment Trabelsi v. Belgium (2015), Application no. 140/10, par. 116 – 118, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-146372], accessed 20. March 2020
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which constitutes, in itself, a grave threat to human rights. It is therefore careful 
not to underestimate the extent of the danger represented by terrorism and the 
threat it poses to society... It considers it legitimate, in the face of such a threat, for 
Contracting States to take a firm stand against those who contribute to terrorist 
acts (ibid). Lastly, the Court does not lose sight of the fundamental aim of extradi-
tion, which is to prevent fugitive offenders from evading justice, nor the beneficial 
purpose which it pursues for all States in a context where crime is taking on a 
larger international dimension… However, none of these factors have any effect 
on the absolute nature of Article 3. As the Court has affirmed on several occasions, 
this rule brooks no exception”.58
Hence, Article 3 of the ECHR “prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment, irrespective of the circumstances and the 
victim’s behaviour”.59
4.1.2.  Right to life
In the case of Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005) the ECtHR points 
out that “Article 2, which safeguards the right to life and sets out the circum-
stances where deprivation of life may be justified, ranks as one of the most funda-
mental provisions in the Convention, from which in peacetime no derogation is 
permitted under Article 15. Together with Article 3, it also enshrines one of the 
basic values of the democratic societies making up the Council of Europe. … The 
Court is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recognises that it must 
be cautious in taking on the role of a first instance tribunal of fact, where this is 
not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case... Nonetheless, 
where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention the Court 
must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny… even if certain domestic proceed-
ings and investigations have already taken place”.60
In the Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy judgment (2011), concerning the circumstanc-
es in which deprivation of life may be justified, the ECtHR emphasized: “In line 
with the principle of strict proportionality inherent in Article 2… the national le-
gal framework must make recourse to firearms dependent on a careful assessment 
of the situation... Furthermore, the national law regulating policing operations 
58  Ibid.
59  Judgment Babar Ahmad and Others v. the United Kingdom (2012), Application nos. 24027/07, 11949/08, 
36742/08, 66911/09 and 67354/09, par. 200, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-110267], ac-
cessed 20. March 2020
60  Judgment Isayeva, Yusupova and Bazayeva v. Russia (2005), op. cit., note 28, par. 168, 169, 171, 173
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must secure a system of adequate and effective safeguards against arbitrariness and 
abuse of force and even against avoidable accident...”61
Nevertheless, in the case of Evans v. the United Kingdom (2007), it found no viola-
tion of Article 2 (right to life) and granted a state a wide margin of appreciation. 
Herewith, the ECtHR points out that “in the absence of any European consensus 
on the scientific and legal definition of the beginning of life, the issue of when 
the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation which the Court 
generally considers that States should enjoy in this sphere”.62 Earlier in its juris-
prudence the ECtHR stated that there was no consensus on the common under-
standing of the concept of ‘moral’ in Europe and “it is not only legally difficult 
to seek harmonisation of national laws at Community level, but because of lack 
of consensus, it would be inappropriate to impose one exclusive moral code”.63 
Accordingly, the ECtHR primarily assesses whether there is a consensus on a par-
ticular issue.
The same applies to the so-called ‘right to death’ and the question of whether the 
right to life also includes the possibility of determining the time and method of 
death. In this context, the ECtHR’s practice is quite uniform. Namely, it empha-
sizes that since there is no consensus on this question, states are afforded a wide 
discretion. So, in the case of Lambert and Others v. France (2015), regarding the 
permission to withdraw the artificial life-sustaining treatment, “the Court reiter-
ates that Article 2 ranks as one of the most fundamental provisions in the Con-
vention, one which, in peace time, admits of no derogation under Article 15, and 
that it construes strictly the exceptions defined therein… However, in the context 
of the State’s positive obligations, when addressing complex scientific, legal and 
ethical issues concerning in particular the beginning or the end of life, and in the 
absence of consensus among the member States, the Court has recognised that the 
latter have a certain margin of appreciation”.64
A state has also a wide margin of appreciation in determining and legislative regu-
lation at the national level of assisted suicide.65 “Comparative research shows that 
the majority of Member States do not allow any form of assistance to suicide... 
61  Judgment Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy (2011), op. cit., note 29, par. 209
62  Judgment Evans v. the United Kingdom (2007), Application no. 6339/05, par. 54, [http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-80046], accessed 20. March 2020
63  Judgment Vo v. France (2004), Application no. 53924/00, par. 82, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-61887], accessed 20. March 2020
64  Judgment Lambert and Others v. France (2015), Application no. 46043/14, par. 144, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-155352], accessed 20. March 2020
65  Judgment Haas v. Switzerland (2011), Application no. 31322/07, par. 54, 55 [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-102940], accessed 20. March 2020
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Only four States examined allowed medical practitioners to prescribe a lethal drug 
in order to enable a patient to end his or her life. It follows that the State Par-
ties to the Convention are far from reaching a consensus in this respect, which 
points towards a considerable margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in this 
context…”66
4.2. Non-absolute human rights and freedoms
When it comes to the other, non-absolute human rights and freedoms, the states 
usually enjoy a wide margin of appreciation, unless there is consensus on a specific 
issue. At the same time, the ECtHR has elaborated some criteria, factors that af-
fect the determination of the width of the margin of appreciation, depending on 
the particular human right at stake.
Thereby, the margin of appreciation is wide in the sphere of social and econom-
ic rights, in determining economic well-being of a country. For example, in the 
James and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment (1986), the ECtHR found it 
natural that the margin of appreciation “available to the legislature in implement-
ing social and economic policies should be a wide one”.67 It stressed: “Because of 
their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are 
in principle better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is ‘in 
the public interest’”.68 Thus, “… the Court will generally respect the legislature’s 
policy choice unless it is ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation”.69
In the case of S.A.S. v. France (2014), concerning the blanket ban on the wearing 
of the full-face veil in public places, the ECtHR pointed out that regarding Art. 8 
(right to respect for private and family life) and Art. 9 (freedom of thought, con-
science and religion), there was no consensus in Europe as to whether or not there 
should be such a ban. Consequently, in search for a fair balance states enjoy a wide 
margin of appreciation. In the present case, the ECtHR concluded that the ban 
imposed by national law could be regarded as proportionate to the aim pursued, 
namely the preservation of the conditions of ‘living together’ as an element of the 
66  Judgment Koch v. Germany (2012), Application no. 497/09, par. 70 [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
eng?i=001-112282], accessed 20. March 2020
67  Judgment James and Others v. the United Kingdom (1986), Application no. 8793/79, par. 46, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57507], accessed 20. March 2020
68  Ibid., par. 46
69  Judgment Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic (2016), op. cit., note 51, par. 179
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‘protection of the rights and freedoms of others’. So, the impugned limitation can 
be regarded as ‘necessary in a democratic society’.70
In respect of the freedom of expression, the breadth of the margin depends on the 
type of speech at issue. “Whilst there is little scope under Article 10 § 2 of the 
Convention for restrictions on political speech…, a wider margin of appreciation 
is generally available to the Contracting States when regulating freedom of expres-
sion in relation to matters liable to offend intimate personal convictions within the 
sphere of morals or, especially, religion... Similarly, States have a broad margin of 
appreciation in the regulation of speech in commercial matters or advertising”.71
In assessing the lawfulness of the interference under Art. 10, the ECtHR analyzes 
such interference in the light of the case as a whole, including the form, the con-
tent and the context in which the impugned statements were made.72 Hence, it 
evaluates not only the substance of the ideas and information expressed, but also 
the form in which they are conveyed.73 
In cases of balancing the right to privacy (Art. 8) and the right to freedom of ex-
pression (Art. 10), the ECtHR reiterates that these rights deserve equal respect. 
Accordingly, the margin of appreciation should be the same in both situations.74 
In doing so, the following relevant criteria must be taken into account: contribu-
tion to a debate of public interest; the degree of notoriety of the person affected; 
the subject of the news report; the prior conduct of the person concerned; the con-
tent; the form; the consequences of the publication; the circumstances in which 
photographs were taken; the way in which the information was obtained and its 
veracity; and the gravity of the penalty imposed on the journalists or publishers.75
4.3. CONSENSUS
It has been revealed that the presence or absence of the so-called European consen-
sus on a particular issue significantly affects the determination of the width of the 
70  Judgment S.A.S. v. France (2014), Application no. 43835/11, par. 157 – 159, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-145466], accessed 20. March 2020
71  Judgment Mouvement raëlien suisse v. Switzerland (2012), Application no. 16354/06, par. 61, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-112165], accessed 20. March 2020
72  Judgment Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (2017), Application 
no. 17224/11, par. 78, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175180], accessed 20. March 2020
73  Judgment Pentikäinen v. Finland (2015), Application no. 11882/10, par. 87, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-158279], accessed 20. March 2020
74  Judgment Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland (2017), Application no. 
931/13, par. 163, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175121], accessed 20. March 2020
75  Ibid., par. 165
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES SERIES (ECLIC) – ISSUE 4146
margin of appreciation granted by the ECtHR to domestic authorities. As a rule, 
if consensus exists, a narrow margin of appreciation will be afforded to a state, and 
vice versa. At the same time, in its case law the ECtHR has repeatedly emphasized 
that, if the case concerns sensitive moral or ethical issues, the margin will be wider. 
Given that human rights and freedoms should be interpreted dynamically in view 
of the progress of science, medicine and society, the practice of the ECtHR is also 
developing. In this context, an existing consensus encourages the evolution of 
autonomous interpretation of certain concepts by the ECtHR, such as family life, 
for example, that also significantly narrows a discretionary power of a state. Ac-
cordingly, the question arises of in which areas the consensus exists, and in which 
there is still no unified approach.
Thus, as has already been established, there is currently no consensus on the is-
sues, such as the beginning and the end of life (in vitro fertilization, home birth,76 
abortion, assisted suicide, euthanasia, etc.), the recognition of the right of an ac-
cused to defend him or herself without the assistance of a registered lawyer (Art. 6, 
par. 3 (c)),77 life imprisonment,78 the concepts of moral, religion (in particular, 
a ban on wearing of the full-face veil in public places or the presence of religious 
symbols in state schools), public interest, national security, public safety, econom-
ic well-being, the pressing social need et al.
Therefore, in the case of Hämäläinen v. Finland (2014), the ECtHR did not find 
any consensus on allowing same-sex marriages, gender recognition and the right 
of transsexuals to marry.79 There is also no consensus on the second-parent adop-
tion by same-sex couples.80 Nevertheless, it notes that despite the lack of consen-
sus, a clear trend is currently emerging to the introduction of different forms of 
legal recognition of same-sex relationships.81
Accordingly, the ECtHR stresses that “when it comes to issues of discrimination 
on the grounds of sex or sexual orientation to be examined under Article 14, the 
76  Judgment Dubská and Krejzová v. the Czech Republic (2016), op. cit., note 51, par. 183
77  Judgment Correia de Matos v. Portugal (2018), Application no. 56402/12, par. 137, [http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-182243], accessed 20. March 2020
78  Judgment Khamtokhu and Aksenchik v. Russia (2017), Application nos. 60367/08 and 961/11, par. 85, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-170663], accessed 20. March 2020
79  Judgment Hämäläinen v. Finland (2014), Application no. 37359/09, par. 74, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-145768], accessed 20. March 2020
80  Judgment X and Others v. Austria (2013), Application no. 19010/07, par. 147, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-116735], accessed 20. March 2020
81  Judgment Vallianatos and Others v. Greece (2013), Application nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, par. 91, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-128294], accessed 20. March 2020
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State’s margin of appreciation is narrow”.82 It further emphasizes that “the ad-
vancement of gender equality is today a major goal in the member States of the 
Council of Europe and very weighty reasons would have to be put forward before 
such a difference of treatment could be regarded as compatible with the Conven-
tion... In particular, references to traditions, general assumptions or prevailing 
social attitudes in a particular country are insufficient justification for a difference 
in treatment on grounds of sex. For example, States are prevented from imposing 
traditions that derive from the man’s primordial role and the woman’s secondary 
role in the family…”83
Regarding the freedom of expression, there is no consensus, inter alia, on how 
to regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting. This lack of consensus also 
broadens the margin of appreciation over the restrictions on public interest expres-
sion.84 However, the ECtHR confirms the consensus on the need to recognize an 
individual right of access to state-held information in order to enable the public 
to “scrutinize and form an opinion on any matters of public interest, including on 
the manner of functioning of public authorities in a democratic society”, that is 
an integral part of the freedom of expression.85 In addition, it highlights that “the 
Internet has now become one of the principal means by which individuals exercise 
their right to freedom to receive and impart information and ideas, providing as 
it does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning 
political issues and issues of general interest…”86
On the other hand, consensus exists on the definition of concepts, such as torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the law, rule of law,87 private 
and family life, home, data protection. There is also a ‘virtually general consensus’ 
on the recognition in the majority of national legislations and practice the right to 
conscientious objection.88
82  Judgment X and Others v. Austria (2013), op. cit., note 80, par. 148
83  Judgment Konstantin Markin v. Russia (2012), Application no. 30078/06, par. 127, [http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-109868], accessed 20. March 2020
84  Judgment Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom (2013), Application no. 48876/08, 
par. 123, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-119244], accessed 20. March 2020
85  Judgment Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary (2016), Application no. 18030/11, par. 139, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-167828], accessed 20. March 2020
86  Judgment Cengiz and Others v. Turkey (2016), Application nos. 48226/10 and 14027/11, par. 49, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-159188], accessed 20. March 2020
87  Nußberger, A., The European Court of Human Rights and rule of law – a tale of hopes and disillusions, in: 
Zubik, M. (ed.), Human rights in contemporary world: Essays in Honour of Professor Leszek Garlicki, 
Wydawnictwo Sejmowe, Warszawa, 2017, pp. 162 – 173
88  Judgment Bayatyan v. Armenia (2011), Application no. 23459/03, par. 103, 108, [http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-105611], accessed 20. March 2020
EU AND COMPARATIVE LAW ISSUES AND CHALLENGES SERIES (ECLIC) – ISSUE 4148
In the judgment of A, B and C v. Ireland (2010), the ECtHR states, that the no-
tion of ‘private life’ within the meaning of Art. 8 is a broad concept which encom-
passes, prima facie, the right to personal autonomy and personal development. It 
concerns such subjects, as gender identification, sexual orientation and sexual life, 
a person’s physical and psychological integrity, as well as decisions both to have 
and not to have a child or to become genetic parents.89 
The concept of ‘private life’ is initially understood as the right to privacy, that is 
the right to live, as far as one wishes, protected from publicity or the right to live 
privately, away from unwanted attention. It protects the right to personal develop-
ment (in terms of personality or personal autonomy) and encompasses the right 
for each individual to establish and develop relationships with other people and 
with the outside world, – the right to a ‘private social life’ that may also include 
professional activities or activities taking place in a public context.90
Moreover, the ECtHR reiterates that the concept of ‘private life’ is not susceptible 
to exhaustive definition and “covers the physical and psychological integrity of 
a person and can therefore embrace multiple aspects of a person’s identity, such 
as gender identification and sexual orientation, name or elements relating to a 
person’s right to their image. The concept covers personal information which in-
dividuals can legitimately expect should not be published without their consent…
”91 Therefore, “the protection of personal data is of fundamental importance to 
a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect for private and family life, as 
guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention. … Article 8 of the Convention thus 
provides for the right to a form of informational self-determination, allowing in-
dividuals to rely on their right to privacy as regards data which, albeit neutral, are 
collected, processed and disseminated collectively and in such a form or manner 
that their Article 8 rights may be engaged”.92
However, “an attack on a person’s reputation must attain a certain level of serious-
ness and in a manner causing prejudice to personal enjoyment of the right to re-
spect for private life. Moreover, Article 8 cannot be relied on in order to complain 
89  Judgment A, B and C v. Ireland (2010), Application no. 25579/05, par. 212, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.
int/eng?i=001-102332], accessed 20. March 2020
90  Judgment National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France 
(2018), op. cit., note 36, par. 152, 153
91  Judgment M.L. and W.W. v. Germany (2018), Application nos. 60798/10 and 65599/10, par. 86, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-183947], accessed 20. March 2020
92  Judgment Satakunnan Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland (2017), Application no. 
931/13, par. 137, [http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-175121], accessed 20. March 2020
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of a loss of reputation which is the foreseeable consequence of one’s own actions 
such as, for example, the commission of a criminal offence…”93
The ECtHR has also emphasized that the Internet as a special source of informa-
tion differs from the print media, especially regarding its capacity to store and 
transmit information. Hence, the risk of harm posed by the content and com-
munications on the Internet to the enjoyment of human rights and freedoms, 
particularly the right to respect for private life, is significantly higher than the risk 
posed by the press, particularly due to the importance of search engines.94 Nev-
ertheless, the ECtHR underlines that “the balancing of the interests at stake may 
result in different outcomes depending on whether a request for deletion concerns 
the original publisher of the information, whose activity is generally at the heart of 
what freedom of expression is intended to protect, or a search engine whose main 
interest is not in publishing the initial information about the person concerned, 
but in particular in facilitating identification of any available information on that 
person and establishing a profile of him or her”.95
At the same time, the ECtHR maintains that the legislation regulating the in-
terruption of pregnancy touches upon the sphere of the private life of a woman 
“cannot be interpreted as meaning that pregnancy and its termination pertain 
uniquely to the woman’s private life as, whenever a woman is pregnant, her private 
life becomes closely connected with the developing foetus. The woman’s right to 
respect for her private life must be weighed against other competing rights and 
freedoms invoked including those of the unborn child”.96
The ECtHR also considered that there was a consensus amongst a substantial ma-
jority of the member states of the Council of Europe towards allowing abortion 
on broader grounds than accorded under Irish law.97 However, it “does not con-
sider that this consensus decisively narrows the broad margin of appreciation of 
the State. ...this consensus cannot be a decisive factor in the Court’s examination 
of whether the impugned prohibition on abortion in Ireland for health and well-
being reasons struck a fair balance between the conflicting rights and interests, 
notwithstanding an evolutive interpretation of the Convention”.98
93  Judgment M.L. and W.W. v. Germany (2018), op. cit., note 91, par. 88
94  Ibid., par. 91
95  Ibid., par. 97
96  Judgment A, B and C v. Ireland (2010), op. cit., note 89, par. 213
97  Ibid., par. 235
98  Ibid., par. 236, 237
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The concept of ‘home’ in the context of Art. 8 is an autonomous one, which does 
not depend on classification under national law, but is defined by reference to the 
factual circumstances, namely the ‘existence of sufficient and continuous links 
with a specific place’. In this sense, a home is the place, the physically defined area, 
where private and family life develops. On this basis, an individual has a right to 
respect for his home that includes not only the right to the actual physical area, 
but also the quiet enjoyment of that area. In particular, it is protected from con-
crete or physical breaches, such as unauthorized entry into a person’s home. In ad-
dition, the notion of ‘home’ may be equally applied to a holiday home. As for an 
artist’s dressing room or a hotel room, the ECtHR has not ruled out that they may 
be considered as a ‘home’. Nevertheless, the concept of home is not confined to 
places of residence where private life is conducted. Consequently, it encompasses 
professional premises as well, that is especially important for the protection of 
individuals against arbitrary interference by public authorities.99
Regarding the notion of ‘family life’ in Art. 8, the ECtHR stresses that it encom-
passes not only families based on marriage, but also other de facto relationships. 
Thus, attention must be drawn to such relevant factors, as whether the couple live 
together, the length of their relationship and whether they have demonstrated their 
commitment to each other by having children together or by any other means.100
Concerning the family life of a child, the ECtHR “reiterates that there is a broad 
consensus, including in international law, in support of the idea that in all deci-
sions concerning children, their best interests are of paramount importance...”101 
In the process of balancing between the interests of parents and the interests of 
a child “a particular importance should be attached to the best interests of the 
child which, depending on their nature and seriousness, may override those of the 
parents…”102 On the other side, “when a considerable period of time has passed 
since the child was originally taken into public care, the interest of a child not to 
have his or her de facto family situation changed again may override the interests 
of the parents to have their family reunited”103.
99  Judgment National Federation of Sportspersons’ Associations and Unions (FNASS) and Others v. France 
(2018), op. cit., note 36, par. 154
100  Judgment X, Y and Z v. the United Kingdom (1997), Application no. 21830/9336, par. 36, [http://
hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-58032], accessed 20. March 2020
101  Judgment Strand Lobben and Others v. Norway (2019), Application no. 37283/13, par. 204, 206, 
[http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-195909], accessed 20. March 2020
102  Ibid., par. 208
103  Ibid.
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With regard to the manner in which the social relationship between a child con-
ceived by artificial insemination by donor and the person who performed the role 
of father should be reflected in law, the ECtHR didn’t observe the existing consen-
sus. In particular, there was no consensus on the matter whether the interests of a 
child were best served by preserving the anonymity of the donor of the sperm or 
whether the child should have the right to know the donor’s identity.104
5. CONCLUSIONS
Under the principle of proportionality each legal interference with human rights 
and freedoms must meet the following criteria: relevancy – the appropriateness 
of the means intended to achieve legal aim to the purpose (the use of prohibited 
means, such as torture, is banned; assessment of the legitimacy of the purpose of 
the mean must be derived from the constitution and the laws; proper validity of 
appropriate mean and its necessity to achieve the goal, – substantive rationality); 
necessity – the use of such mean that least restricts the right of the individual; 
proportionality in the narrow sense: the proportionality of a person’s loss (harm) 
from the restriction of the right to the benefit gained from the goal pursued, – the 
principle of balancing (procedural rationality).
The permissible limitations on human rights must be prescribed by the law and be 
necessary in a democratic society. The quality of the law requires it to be accessible 
and foreseeable. The concept of the law (in its substantive sense) may encompass 
the secondary and unwritten law.
In turn, the concept of democratic society refers to its basic elements, such as 
pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In order to strike a fair balance, the 
ECtHR applies strict (in respect of absolute rights) and persuasive (convincing) 
democratic necessity tests.
Under the strict necessity test, any interference with human rights must be strictly 
proportionate to the achievement of the permitted aims. In this regard, the states 
generally enjoy a narrow margin of appreciation.
The convincing test on necessity requires the establishment of the existence of a 
real pressing social need as well as relevant and sufficient reasons for the interfer-
ence with human rights and freedoms that must be convincingly shown by do-
mestic authorities. Therefore, the margin afforded is wider.
104  Judgment S.H. and Others v. Austria (2011), Application no. 57813/00, par. 83, [http://hudoc.echr.
coe.int/eng?i=001-107325], accessed 20. March 2020
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The scope and the width of the margin of appreciation depends on the nature 
of the right in issue, its importance for the individual, and the nature of the aim 
pursued by the restrictions.
In case of positive obligations of a state, it would rather have a wide margin of ap-
preciation. When it comes to negative obligations, a margin is quite narrow. It also 
concerns the interpretation by domestic authorities of such ambiguous concepts, 
as national security, public safety, economic well-being, morality, democracy et 
al. On the one hand, it is justified by the principle of non-interference in state 
sovereignty (based on the demand for pluralism in a democratic society) and, on 
the other, by the lack of consensus among the Council of Europe member states 
on some morally and ethically sensitive issues.
Therefore, the presence of the European consensus on a particular issue plays a 
key role in assessing the margin of appreciation. If consensus exists, the margin is 
narrow. If the issue concerns complex moral or ethical questions on which there is 
no consensus, the margin is wide.
The evolution of consensus contributes to the development of dynamic interpreta-
tion of human rights, as well as autonomous concepts elaborated in the case law 
of the ECtHR. These concepts (e.g., private and family life, home, rule of law, the 
law, torture, data protection, etc.) significantly narrow the margin of free discre-
tion of a state.
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